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Hello,
My name is Zachary Deveau, I've been a computer security professional for over 5 years, having previously spent two of those at our nation's largest internet service provider.
On the topic of section 3.3 (Approaches in Other Jurisdictions)
If anything is to be learned from how the E.U. changed its framework by excluding activities of certain "online content-sharing service providers" from the "hosting" safe harbour, it is that imposing strict regulation on content-sharing services will reduce competition and further consolidate power into established corporate entities who can afford to effectively comply with such an imposition. For example, the ContentID system created by team YouTube was done at a cost of roughly 100 million dollars.Footnote 1 This prices out the vast majority of the possible competition.
Even with the resources of one of the planet's largest parent companies, the ContentID system is not without its faults. ContentID is notorious for enabling corporate rights holders to wipe out independent creators with impunity even in the event of a false positive. There is little to no accountability in the event that a rights holder gets a claim wrong.Footnote 2
By attempting to apply frameworks designed for the finite markets of television and radio to the infinite market that is the internet, we will be doing little more than pushing the infringement further into the depths of the web where enforcement is much more difficult. Infringement will continue to exist so long as there isn't a frictionless and affordable path to consuming media.
Instead of emerging digital markets needing to regress to appease a failing copyright system, we should focus on exploring how the copyright ecosystem should adapt to meet the demands of creators, consumers and rights holders in a digital by default age.
On the topic of potential options for reform, section 4.2 (Compel Remuneration Through Collective Licensing) describes the types of solutions that are worth exploring. Subject to strictly enforced safeguards that prevent rights holders from abusing such a Compulsory licensing scheme, subsection a. looks to be a sound avenue to explore.
In closing, I would like to leave you with the following two considerations. First, it is a fallacy that a stream on Youtube is a stream that represents what would have been a paying customer. Arguments built on the idea that a stream on content-sharing services is lost revenue incorrectly assume the intent of the consumer. Second, I would take great care to avoid situations where an ISP has any influence on enforcement decisions. Particularly in the case where they have a clear conflict of interest. For example, Bell Canada, our nation's largest ISP, belongs to the same parent company (BCE ) as Bell Media, one of our nation's largest rights holders.