Consultation on a Policy and Licensing Framework for Spectrum in the 26, 28 and 38 GHz Bands — Annexes

June 2022

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Notes (July 2022):

  • Corrections were made to paragraph 207 to reference the licence fees in the 10-95 GHz frequency range in section 20.
  • A correction has been made to the population for area 3-053 in table C1 in annex C.
  • A correction has been made to the table E1 in annex E. Area 5-597 has been removed and area 5-599 has been added.
  • Corrections have been made to the MHz for areas 5-257, 5-400, 5-410, 5-412, 5-413, 5-414, 5-418, 5-420, 5-421, 5-422, 5-504, 5-511, 5-563, 5-583, 5-625, 5-626, and 5-628 in table F2 in annex F.

Annex A: Current Tier 3 spectrum licences in the 38 GHz band

Table A1: Current Tier 3 spectrum licences in the 38 GHz band
Licensee Licence number Tier number Tier name Licence expiry
ABC Communications 010305499 3-057 Prince George January 20, 2025
Xplornet 010305500 3-040 Brandon January 20, 2025
TeraGo 010305467 3-020 Kingston January 20, 2025
TeraGo 010305468 3-020 Kingston January 20, 2025
TeraGo 010305471 3-020 Kingston January 20, 2025
TeraGo 010305472 3-026 Barrie January 20, 2025
TeraGo 010305473 3-026 Barrie January 20, 2025
TeraGo 010305474 3-029 Niagara-St. Catharines January 20, 2025
TeraGo 010305475 3-029 Niagara-St. Catharines January 20, 2025
TeraGo 010305476 3-029 Niagara-St. Catharines January 20, 2025
TeraGo 010305480 3-030 London/Woodstock/St. Thomas January 20, 2025
TeraGo 010305481 3-030 London/Woodstock/St. Thomas January 20, 2025
TeraGo 010305483 3-032 Windsor/Leamington January 20, 2025
TeraGo 010305484 3-032 Windsor/Leamington January 20, 2025
TeraGo 010305485 3-032 Windsor/Leamington January 20, 2025
TeraGo 010305486 3-032 Windsor/Leamington January 20, 2025
TeraGo 010305487 3-039 Winnipeg January 20, 2025
TeraGo 010305488 3-039 Winnipeg January 20, 2025
TeraGo 010305489 3-047 Calgary January 20, 2025
TeraGo 010305490 3-047 Calgary January 20, 2025
TeraGo 010305491 3-048 Red Deer January 20, 2025
TeraGo 010305492 3-048 Red Deer January 20, 2025
TeraGo 010305493 3-048 Red Deer January 20, 2025
TeraGo 010305495 3-051 Okanagan/Columbia January 20, 2025
TeraGo 010305496 3-051 Okanagan/Columbia January 20, 2025
TeraGo 010305497 3-051 Okanagan/Columbia January 20, 2025
TeraGo 010305498 3-053 Victoria January 20, 2025

Annex B: List of satellite earth stations

Table B1: List of earth stations licensed prior to June 5, 2017, or earth stations with applications pending approval as of June 5, 2017
Company name Licence number Tier 5 service area Location Longitude Latitude Frequency (GHz) Flexible use frequency block(s)
Hughes Network Systems Canada 010308797-002 5-326: London London, ON 81°W12'0.4” 42°N55'23.9” 27.52763-27.76363, 
27.76388-27.99988,
28.00013-28.23613,
28.23638-28.47238
L, M, N, P, Q, R, S, T, U
Hughes Network Systems Canada 010311081-001 5-447: Pilot Butte White City, SK 104°W23'24.7” 50°N26'57.7” 27.52763-27.76363,
27.76388-27.99988,
28.00013-28.23613,
28.23638-28.47238
L, M, N, P, Q, R, S, T, U
Inmarsat Solutions (Canada) Inc. 010304770-001 5-400: Winnipeg Winnipeg, MB 97°W02'44” 49°N51'32” 27.5-27.6,
27.625-27.725,
27.75-27.85,
27.875-27.975,
28.00425-28.00975,
28.024-28.056,
28.064-28.096,
28.104-28.136,
28.144-28.176,
28.184-28.216,
28.224-28.256,
28.264-28.296,
28.304-28.336,
28.344-28.376
L, M, N,
P, Q, R, S, T, U
Telesat Canada 010000233-001 5-537: Fort McMurray Fort McMurray, AB 111°W19'59” 56°N40'16” 28.0985-28.164,
28.35-28.4125
R, S, U
Telesat Canada 010000809-001 5-451: Saskatoon Saskatoon, SK 106°W40'11” 52°N05'09” 28.0985-28.164,
28.1-28.1625,
28.1625-28.225,
28.225-28.2875,
28.2875-28.35
R, S, T, U
Telesat Canada 010001551-001 5-001: St. John's St. John's, NL 52°W47'36” 47°N32'34” 28.10565-28.15685,
28.16815-28.21935,
28.23065-28.28185,
28.29315-28.34435
S, T, U
Telesat Canada 010740878-001 5-303: Hanover Allan Park, ON 80°W56'08” 44°N10'29” 27.4998-27.5042,
28.3478-28.3522
K, L, U
WildBlue Communications Canada 010001269-001 5-400: Winnipeg Winnipeg, MB 97°W02'43” 49°N51'32” 28.10000-29.10000 S, T, U
Xplornet 010735923-001 5-521: Edmonton Sherwood Park, AB 113°W17'07.6” 53°N30'44.9” 27.8575-28.0925,
28.1075-28.3425
P, Q, R,
S, T, U
Xplornet 010687383-001 5-448: Regina Regina, SK 104°W28'42.5” 50°N26'46.8” 27.8575-28.0925,
28.1075-28.3425
P, Q, R,
S, T, U
Table B2: List of earth stations with applications submitted after June 5, 2017, and before the release of the 2019 Decision

Company name
Licence number Tier 5 licensing area Location Longitude Latitude Frequency (GHz) Flexible use frequency block(s)
Telesat 010762264-001 5-451: Saskatoon Saskatoon, SK 106°W40'08” 52°N05'09” 27.625165-27.758165,
27.62528-27.72628,
27.726565-27.796865,
27.758305-27.812905,
27.796845-27.919845,
27.81288-27.91288,
27.912895-27.961095,
27.919795-28.042795,
27.96112-28.01392,
28.013935-28.057935,
28.042775-28.113075,
28.057985-28.147185,
28.11308-28.13808,
28.138075-28.161375,
28.147245-28.195445,
28.161515-28.322515,
28.195465-28.230665,
28.230675-28.275775,
28.275755-28.318055,
28.375015-28.504015
M, N, P, Q, R, S, T, U
Telesat 010776769-001 5-453: Waldheim Hague, SK 106°W24'0” 52°N31'18” 27.625165-27.758165,
27.62528-27.72628,
27.726565-27.796865,
27.758305-27.812905,
27.796845-27.919845,
27.81288-27.91288,
27.912895-27.961095,
27.919795-28.042795,
27.96112-28.01392,
28.013935-28.057935,
28.042775-28.113075,
28.057985-28.147185,
28.11308-28.13808,
28.138075-28.161375,
28.147245-28.195445,
28.161515-28.322515,
28.195465-28.230665,
28.230675-28.275775,
28.275755-28.318055,
28.378015-28.501015
M, N, P, Q, R, S, T, U
WorldVu (1021823 B.C.) 010746495-001 5-654: Inuvialuit-Gwich'in Inuvik*, NT 133°W36'37.35” 68°N19'34.14” 27.5245-27.5255,
27.5285-27.5295
L
Northwestel Inc. 010765286-001 5-641: Iqaluit Iqaluit*, NU 68°W30'52” 63°N44'44” 27.624985-27.675385,
27.675355-27.725755,
27.725725-27.776125,
27.776725-27.827125,
27.826465-27.876865,
27.876835-27.927235
M, N, P, Q
Northwestel Inc. 010765285-001 5-642: Cape Dorset Qikiqtarjuaq*, NU 64°W01'13” 67°N33'41” 28.02501-28.06501 R
Northwestel Inc. 010765284-001 5-642: Cape Dorset Kimmirut*, NU 69°W52'07” 62°N50'35” 27.98799-28.02499 Q, R
Northwestel Inc. 010765283-001 5-645: Resolute Bay Grise Fiord*, NU 82°W54'53” 76°N25'12” 27.958355-27.987955 Q
Northwestel Inc. 010765282-001 5-642: Cape Dorset Clyde River*, NU 68°W35'30” 70°N28'30” 27.869445-27.958345 P, Q
Northwestel Inc. 010765244-001 5-642: Cape Dorset Pond Inlet*, NU 77°W58'21” 72°N41'43” 27.77315-27.86945 N, P
Northwestel Inc. 010758611-001 5-642: Cape Dorset Pangnirtung*, NU 65°W42'26” 66°N08'42” 27.625075-27.773075 M, N

*These stations are located in Tier 5 service areas listed in annex E.

Table B3: List of earth stations licensed after the publication of the 2019 Decision
Company name Licence number Tier 5 service area Location Longitude Latitude Frequency (GHz) and flexible use frequency block(s)
SES 010875974-001 5-001: St. John’s St. John’s, NL 52°W47’38.44” 47°N32’36.80” 27.0-27.5 (F, G, H, J, K)
27.5-28.0 (L, M, N, P, Q)
28.0-28.5 (R, S, T, U)
SES 010840935-001 5-326: London London, ON 81°W11' 58.7" 42°N55' 22" 27.0-27.5 (F, G, H, J, K)
27.5-28.0 (L, M, N, P, Q)
28.0-28.5 (R, S, T, U)
SES 010890404-001 5-400: Winnipeg Winnipeg, MB 97°W10’38.49” 49°N49’29.95” 27.0-27.5 (F, G, H, J, K)
27.5-28.0 (L, M, N, P, Q)
28.0-28.5 (R, S, T, U)
SpaceX 010919209-001 5-001: St. John’s St. John’s, NL 52°W46'31.50" 47°N33'39.20 27.51-27.99 (L, M, N, P, Q)
28.06-28.54 (R, S, T, U)
SpaceX 010923517-001 5-040: St. Margarets Bay Sambro Creek, NS 63°W36'47.1" 44°N27'52.3" 27.50-28.35 (L, M, N, P, Q, R, S, T, U)
SpaceX 010878067-001 5-105: La Baie La Baie, QC 70°W54'32.3" 48°N18'49.2" 27.50-28.35 (L, M, N, P, Q, R, S, T, U)
SpaceX 010849214-001 5-386: Manitouwadge Marathon, ON 86°W22'28.1" 48°N43'31.2" 27.50-28.35 (L, M, N, P, Q, R, S, T, U)
Telesat Canada 010849608-001 5-196: Val-David Montcalm, QC 74°W 32' 1" 45°N 56' 39" 27.509-27.89 (L, M, N, P)
27.909-28.29 (Q, R, S, T)
28.309-28.69 (U)
Telesat Canada 010853230-001 5-209: Ottawa-Gatineau,
5-217: La Pêche,
5-208: Perkins
Cantley, QC 75°W 48' 38" 45°N 35' 16" 27.509-27.89 (L, M, N, P)
27.909-28.29 (Q, R, S, T)
28.309-28.69 (U)
Telesat Canada 010842518-001 5-303: Hanover Allan Park, ON 80°W 56' 10" 44°N 10' 24" 27.509-27.89 (L, M, N, P)
27.909-28.29 (Q, R, S, T)
28.309-28.69 (U)
Telesat Canada 010849924-001 5-467: Kinistino,
5-468: Prince Albert,
5-466: Shelbrooke,
5-469: Wakaw
Buckland, SK 105°W 55' 52" 53°N 12' 45" 27.509-27.89 (L, M, N, P)
27.909-28.29 (Q, R, S, T)
28.309-28.69 (U)
Xplornet 010836795-001 5-144: Shawinigan,
5-146: Trois-Rivières
Notre-Dame-du-Mont-Carmel, QC 72°W39'6.451" 46°N29'31.236" 27.618-28.082 (M, N, P, Q, R)
28.118-28.582 (S, T, U)
Xplornet 010836793-001 5-214: Smiths Falls,
5-215: Westport
Perth, ON 76°W16'34.543" 44°N54'13.406" 27.618-28.082 (M, N, P, Q, R)
28.118-28.582 (S, T, U)
Xplornet 010836791-001 5-282: Toronto Toronto, ON 79°W20'10.24" 43°N43'37.4" 27.618-28.082 (M, N, P, Q, R)
28.118-28.582 (S, T, U)
Xplornet 010836789-001
5-412: Brandon Brandon, MB 99°W58'0.055" 49°N50'3.008" 27.618-28.082 (M, N, P, Q, R)
28.118-28.582 (S, T, U)
Xplornet 010836767-001
5-448: Regina Regina, SK 104°W28’43.946” 50°N26’45.91” 27.618-28.082 (M, N, P, Q, R)
28.118-28.582 (S, T, U)
Xplornet 010836683-001 5-521: Edmonton Edmonton, AB 113°W17’09” 53°N30’44.4” 27.618-28.082 (M, N, P, Q, R)
28.118-28.582 (S, T, U)

Annex C: Proposed Tier 5 deployment requirements for transition of each Tier 5 area within existing Tier 3 spectrum licences

Table C1: Proposed Tier 5 deployment requirements for transition of each Tier 5 area within existing Tier 3 spectrum licences
Licensee Tier 3 number Tier 3 name Number of licences 2016 population Number of links at 8/million Number of links rounded up Tier 4 number Tier 5 number 2016 population Proposed number of links at 8/million Proposed number of links rounded up
ABC Communications 3-057 Prince George 1 188487 1.5 2 4-166 5-621 682 0.005 1
5-622 9272 0.074 1
5-623 28130 0.225 1
5-624 18151 0.145 1
4-167 5-625 8668 0.069 1
5-626 76467 0.612 1
5-627 9472 0.076 1
4-168 5-628 8326 0.067 1
5-629 8575 0.069 1
5-630 11923 0.095 1
5-631 8822 0.071 1
Xplornet 3-040 Brandon 1 179251 1.4 2 4-114 5-410 18971 0.152 1
5-411 9410 0.075 1
5-412 50111 0.401 1
5-413 14708 0.118 1
5-414 10543 0.084 1
4-116 5-416 8194 0.066 1
5-417 13178 0.105 1
5-418 10887 0.087 1
5-419 11989 0.096 1
5-420 9657 0.077 1
5-421 13249 0.106 1
5-422 8354 0.067 1
TeraGo 3-020 Kingston 3 177314 1.4 2 4-070 5-257 138566 1.109 2
5-258 18774 0.150 1
5-259 8744 0.070 1
5-260 11230 0.090 1
3-026 Barrie 2 716446 5.7 6 4-078 5-287 30891 0.247 1
5-288 40795 0.326 1
5-289 12398 0.099 1
5-290 14788 0.118 1
5-291 30407 0.243 1
4-081 5-297 10751 0.086 1
5-298 5769 0.046 1
5-299 17510 0.140 1
5-300 42866 0.343 1
5-301 13975 0.112 1
5-302 13297 0.106 1
5-303 21586 0.173 1
5-304 9983 0.080 1
5-305 9336 0.075 1
5-306 13723 0.110 1
5-307 11446 0.092 1
5-308 15577 0.125 1
4-094 5-348 22983 0.184 1
5-349 206427 1.651 2
5-350 43252 0.346 1
5-351 7114 0.057 1
5-352 7804 0.062 1
5-353 64711 0.518 1
4-095 5-354 38581 0.309 1
5-355 10478 0.084 1
3-029 Niagara-St. Catharines 3 380354 3.0 4 4-083 5-315 31072 0.249 1
4-084 5-316 349283 2.794 3
3-030 London/Woodstock/St. Thomas 2 854082 6.8 7 4-085 5-317 37398 0.299 1
4-086 5-318 70780 0.566 1
5-319 9494 0.076 1
5-320 10262 0.082 1
5-321 46604 0.373 1
5-322 34499 0.276 1
5-323 26551 0.212 1
5-324 8121 0.065 1
5-325 10758 0.086 1
5-326 399186 3.193 4
5-327 50341 0.403 1
5-328 11553 0.092 1
4-087 5-329 131035 1.048 2
5-330 7499 0.060 1
3-032 Windsor/Leamington 4 401719 3.2 4 4-090 5-335 48069 0.385 1
5-336 25427 0.203 1
5-337 19467 0.156 1
5-338 308755 2.470 3
3-039 Winnipeg 2 1098765 8.8 9 4-110 5-392 7998 0.064 1
5-393 12803 0.102 1
5-394 34551 0.276 1
5-395 9411 0.075 1
4-111 5-396 18863 0.151 1
5-397 13798 0.110 1
5-398 13036 0.104 1
5-399 22063 0.177 1
5-400 748791 5.990 6
5-401 13600 0.109 1
4-112 5-402 15366 0.123 1
5-403 15874 0.127 1
5-404 8275 0.066 1
5-405 6086 0.0487 1
5-406 12474 0.100 1
4-113 5-407 10210 0.082 1
5-408 29967 0.240 1
5-409 11432 0.091 1
4-115 5-415 21273 0.170 1
4-117 5-423 4012 0.032 1
5-424 18215 0.146 1
4-118 5-425 22219 0.178 1
5-426 22304 0.178 1
5-427 6142 0.0491 1
3-047 Calgary 2 1582542 12.7 13 4-134 5-497 10123 0.081 1
5-498 68431 0.547 1
5-499 4165 0.333 1
4-135 5-500 23724 0.189 1
5-501 10295 0.082 1
5-502 11459 0.092 1
4-136 5-503 17054 0.136 1
5-504 1299627 10.397 11
5-505 39656 0.317 1
5-506 34470 0.276 1
5-507 16976 0.136 1
5-508 9073 0.073 1
3-048 Red Deer 3 260727 2.1 3 4-137 5-509 21083 0.169 1
5-510 43501 0.348 1
5-511 105377 0.843 1
5-512 36426 0.291 1
4-138 5-513 23899 0.191 1
5-514 30441 0.244 1
3-051 Okanagan/Columbia 3 436342 3.5 4 4-151 5-559 8578 0.069 1
5-560 12127 0.097 1
5-561 11556 0.092 1
5-562 58675 0.469 1
5-563 194792 1.558 2
5-564 19640 0.157 1
5-565 49810 0.398 1
5-566 7637 0.061 1
4-159 5-604 7243 0.058 1
5-605 8406 0.067 1
4-162 5-610 11803 0.094 1
5-611 6845 0.055 1
5-612 10719 0.086 1
5-613 21658 0.173 1
4-163 5-614 6854 0.055 1
3-053 Victoria 1 458861 1.3 2 4-154 5-582 15854 0.127 1
5-583 352999 2.824 3
5-584 18292 0.146 1
5-585 43937 0.351 1
5-586 12146 0.097 1
5-587 15632 0.125 1

Annex D: Proposed deployment requirements per Tier 5 service area

Table D1: Proposed deployment requirements per Tier 5 service area
Service area number Tier 5 service area name Service area / transition plan category Option 1: Proposed number of stations per 100 MHz block at year 5 Option 1: Proposed number of stations per 100 MHz block at year 9.5 Option 2: Proposed number of stations per 100 MHz block at year 5 Option 2: Proposed number of stations per 100 MHz block at year 9.5

Annex E: List of proposed satellite-dependent Tier 5 service areas

Table E1: List of proposed satellite-dependent Tier 5 service areas
Tier 5 Category Name
5-017 Remote | éloignée Labrador City/Happy Valley-Goose Bay
5-018 Remote | éloignée Hopedale
5-019 Remote | éloignée Nain
5-234 Rural | rurale Malartic
5-235 Rural | rurale Senneterre
5-245 Remote | éloignée Chibougamau
5-246 Remote | éloignée Chisasibi-Baie-James
5-247 Remote | éloignée Caniapiscau
5-248 Remote | éloignée Schefferville
5-249 Remote | éloignée Kuujjuaq
5-250 Remote | éloignée Inukjuak
5-376 Rural | rurale Kapuskasing
5-377 Rural | rurale Moose Factory
5-378 Rural | rurale Hearst
5-379 Remote | éloignée Fort Hope/Attawapiskat River
5-380 Remote | éloignée Dryden
5-381 Remote | éloignée Kenora
5-382 Rural | rurale Wawa
5-383 Rural | rurale Thessalon
5-386 Remote | éloignée Manitouwadge
5-387 Remote | éloignée Lake Nipigon
5-388 Remote | éloignée Suomi
5-390 Rural | rurale Atikokan
5-391 Rural | rurale Fort Frances
5-402 Rural | rurale Lac du Bonnet
5-403 Rural | rurale Northern Interlake | Interlake-Nord
5-404 Rural | rurale Arborg
5-405 Rural | rurale Gimli
5-406 Rural | rurale Warren
5-415 Rural | rurale Portage la Prairie
5-423 Rural | rurale Grand Rapids
5-424 Rural | rurale The Pas
5-425 Remote | éloignée Island Lake
5-426 Remote | éloignée Thompson
5-427 Remote | éloignée Churchill
5-477 Remote | éloignée La Ronge
5-478 Remote | éloignée La Loche
5-479 Remote | éloignée Wollaston Lake
5-541 Rural | rurale Slave Lake
5-542 Rural | rurale High Prairie
5-543 Rural | rurale Manning
5-544 Rural | rurale Grimshaw
5-545 Rural | rurale Fairview
5-546 Rural | rurale High Level
5-598 Rural | rurale Powell River
5-599 Rural | rurale Heriot Bay
5-600 Rural | rurale Bella Coola
5-608 Rural | rurale Clearwater
5-609 Rural | rurale Ashcroft
5-615 Rural | rurale 100 Mile House
5-616 Rural | rurale Lac la Hache
5-617 Rural | rurale Williams Lake
5-618 Rural | rurale Alexis Creek/Anahim Lake
5-619 Rural | rurale Quesnel
5-620 Rural | rurale Wells
5-621 Remote | éloignée Lower Post
5-622 Remote | éloignée Stewart-Dease Lake
5-623 Remote | éloignée Terrace
5-624 Remote | éloignée Prince Rupert
5-628 Rural | rurale Vanderhoof
5-629 Rural | rurale Burns Lake
5-630 Rural | rurale Smithers
5-631 Rural | rurale Fort St. James
5-632 Rural | rurale Dawson Creek
5-633 Rural | rurale Tumbler Ridge
5-634 Rural | rurale Fort St. John
5-635 Rural | rurale Fort Nelson
5-636 Rural | rurale Wonowon
5-637 Remote | éloignée Faro
5-638 Remote | éloignée Mayo
5-639 Remote | éloignée Whitehorse
5-640 Remote | éloignée Dawson City
5-641 Remote | éloignée Iqaluit
5-642 Remote | éloignée Cape Dorset
5-643 Remote | éloignée Sanikiluaq
5-644 Remote | éloignée Arviat
5-645 Remote | éloignée Resolute Bay
5-646 Remote | éloignée Gjoa Haven
5-647 Remote | éloignée Fort Smith
5-648 Remote | éloignée Yellowknife
5-649 Remote | éloignée MacKay Lake
5-650 Remote | éloignée Tlicho
5-651 Remote | éloignée Hottah Lake
5-652 Remote | éloignée Hay River-Nahanni
5-653 Remote | éloignée Sahtu
5-654 Remote | éloignée Inuvialuit-Gwich'in

Annex F: Proposed spectrum not available for the auction

Table F1 shows spectrum that ISED is proposing will not be available for auction in the 28 GHz band as described in section 12.1.

Table F1: Spectrum not available for auction in the 28 GHz band
Tier number Tier name Population
(2016)
Blocks Total MHz
5-400 Winnipeg 748,791 L, M, N, P, Q, R, S, T 800
5-447 Pilot Butte 14,062 L, M, N, P, Q, R, S, T 800
5-448 Regina 215,802 P, Q, R, S, T 500

Table F2 shows the amount of spectrum that ISED is proposing will not be available for auction in the 38 GHz band as described in section 12.1. The specific blocks that will not be available for auction will be dependent on which blocks are assigned to existing fixed licensees, as described in section 9.1.

Table F2: Amount of spectrum not available for auction in the 38 GHz band
Tier number Tier name Population
(2016)
Total MHz
5-257 Kingston 138,566 600
5-349 Barrie 206,427 200
5-316 Niagara-St. Catharines 349,283 600
5-326 London 399,186 200
5-329 Brantford 131,035 200
5-338 Windsor 308,755 400
5-400 Winnipeg 748,791 200
5-410 Souris/Cartwright 18,971 100
5-412 Brandon 50,111 100
5-413 Neepawa 14,708 100
5-414 Treherne 10,543 100
5-418 Dauphin 10,887 100
5-420 Roblin 9,657 100
5-421 Virden 13,249 100
5-422 Melita 8,354 100
5-504 Calgary 1,299,627 200
5-511 Red Deer 105,377 600
5-563 Kelowna 194,792 600
5-583 Victoria 352,999 100
5-625 Mackenzie 8,668 100
5-626 Prince George 76,467 100
5-628 Vanderhoof 8,326 100

Annex G: Proposed spectrum with existing licensees available for auction

Table G1: Proposed spectrum with existing licensees available for auction
Tier number Tier name Population of Tier 5
(2016)
Percentage of population covered by existing licensees (2016) Blocks Licensee Total MHz
5-001 St. John's 208,869 2% S, T Telesat 200
5-001 St. John’s 208,869 3% F, G, H, J, K, L, M, N, P, Q, R, S, T SES 1,300
5-001 St. John’s 208,869 0.30% L, M, N, P, Q, R, S, T SpaceX 800
5-040 St. Margarets Bay 20,731 1% L, M, N, P, Q, R, S, T SpaceX 800
5-105 La Baie 37,538 12% L, M, N, P, Q, R, S, T SpaceX 800
5-144 Shawinigan 58,257 1% M, N, P, Q, R, S, T Xplornet 700
5-146 Trois-Rivières 151,991 0.20% M, N, P, Q, R, S, T Xplornet 700
5-196 Val-David 24,348 0.50% L, M, N, P, Q, R, S, T Telesat 800
5-198 Mont-Tremblant 20,577 0.40% L, M, N, P, Q, R, S, T Telesat 800
5-208 Perkins 12,153 3% L, M, N, P, Q, R, S, T Telesat 800
5-209 Ottawa-Gatineau 1,191,731 0.20% L, M, N, P, Q, R, S, T Telesat 800
5-214 Smiths Falls 35,306 7% M, N, P, Q, R, S, T Xplornet 700
5-215 Westport 18,697 2% M, N, P, Q, R, S, T Xplornet 700
5-217 La Pêche 13,246 5% L, M, N, P, Q, R, S, T Telesat 800
5-282 Toronto 2,723,714 0.30% M, N, P, Q, R, S, T Xplornet 700
5-303 Hanover 21,586 2% K, L Telesat 200
5-303 Hanover 21,586 13% L, M, N, P, Q, R, S, T Telesat 800
5-326 London 399,186 5% L, M, N, P, Q, R, S, T Hughes 800
5-326 London 399,186 5% F, G, H, J, K, L, M, N, P, Q, R, S, T SES 1,300
5-386 Manitouwadge 17,396 3% L, M, N, P, Q, R, S, T SpaceX 800
5-396 Lorette 18,863 6% R Inmarsat 100
5-396 Lorette 18,863 7% S, T Inmarsat/Wildblue 200
5-397 Oakbank 13,798 0.30% L, M, N, P, Q Inmarsat 500
5-397 Oakbank 13,798 1% R Inmarsat 100
5-397 Oakbank 13,798 1% S, T Inmarsat/Wildblue 200
5-400 Winnipeg 748,791 1% F, G, H, J, K, L, M, N, P, Q, R, S, T SES 1,300
5-412 Brandon 50,111 37% M, N, P, Q, R, S, T Xplornet 700
5-448 Regina 215,802 0.01% L, M, N Hughes 300
5-448 Regina 215,802 0.30% M, N, P, Q, R, S, T Xplornet 700
5-451 Saskatoon 248,978 5% M, N, P, Q, R, S, T Telesat 700
5-452 Martensville 33,403 0.30% M, N, P, Q, R, S, T Telesat 700
5-453 Waldheim 8,509 22% M, N, P, Q, R, S, T Telesat 700
5-466 Shelbrooke 11,257 0.20% L, M, N, P, Q, R, S, T Telesat 800
5-467 Kinistino 12,421 3% L, M, N, P, Q, R, S, T Telesat 800
5-468 Prince Albert 38,619 1% L, M, N, P, Q, R, S, T Telesat 800
5-469 Wakaw 10,235 0.30% L, M, N, P, Q, R, S, T Telesat 800
5-521 Edmonton 1,198,083 5% P, Q, R, S, T Xplornet 500
5-521 Edmonton 1,198,083 1% M, N, P, Q, R, S, T Xplornet 700
5-537 Fort McMurray 69,373 4% R, S Telesat 200
5-641 Iqaluit 7,420 44% M, N, P, Q NorthwesTel 400
5-642 Cape Dorset 10,385 6% M NorthwesTel 100
5-642 Cape Dorset 10,385 7% N NorthwesTel 100
5-642 Cape Dorset 10,385 3% P NorthwesTel 100
5-642 Cape Dorset 10,385 4% Q NorthwesTel 100
5-642 Cape Dorset 10,385 2% R NorthwesTel 100
5-645 Resolute Bay 330 1% Q NorthwesTel 100
5-654 Inuvialuit-Gwich'in 6,369 51% L WorldVu 100

Annex H: Proposed conditions of licence for spectrum licences in the 26, 28 and 38 GHz bands

The following conditions will apply to all flexible use licences in the 26, 28 and 38 GHz bands as defined in the resulting licensing framework (referred to as the Framework).

It should be noted that the licences are subject to the relevant provisions in the Radiocommunication Act and the Radiocommunication Regulations, as amended from time to time. For example, the Minister of Innovation, Science and Industry (the Minister) continues to have the power to amend the terms and conditions of spectrum licences, under paragraph 5(1)(b) of the Radiocommunication Act. The Minister may do so for a variety of reasons, including furtherance of the policy objectives related to the band. Such action would normally only be undertaken after consultation.

H1. Licence term

The term of this licence is 10 years from the date that licences are first issued following the auction procedure (“the initial licence issuance date”) set out in the Policy and Licensing Framework for Spectrum in the 26, 28 and 38 GHz bands (the “Framework”). Whether the licence was issued on the initial licence issuance date or issued at any later time, in accordance with transition provisions of the Framework, all licences will terminate on the same date, 10 years after the initial licence issuance date.

At the end of this term, the licensee will generally have a high expectation that a new licence will be issued for a subsequent term through a renewal process unless a breach of licence condition has occurred, a fundamental reallocation of spectrum to a new service is required, or an overriding policy need arises.

The process for issuing licences after this term and any issues relating to renewal, including the terms and conditions of the new licence, will be determined by the Minister of Innovation, Science and Industry (the Minister) following a public consultation.

H2. Fees

Licences obtained through the transition process as described in SLPB-003-19, Decision on Releasing Millimetre Wave Spectrum to Support 5G (the “2019 Decision”), will be subject to any applicable licence fees.

H3. Eligibility

The licensee must comply on an ongoing basis with the applicable eligibility criteria in subsection 9(1) of the Radiocommunication Regulations and, where applicable, with the eligibility criteria for set-aside licences as defined under the Framework. The licensee must notify the Minister of any change that would have a material effect on either type of eligibility. Such notification must be made in advance for any proposed transactions within its knowledge.

H4. Licence transferability, divisibility and subordinate licensing

This licence is transferable in whole or in part (divisibility), in both bandwidth and geographic dimensions, subject to ISED's approval. A Subordinate Licence may also be issued in regard to this licence. ISED's approval is required for each proposed Subordinate Licence.

The licensee must make the Transfer Request in writing to ISED. The Transfer Request will be treated as set out in Client Procedures Circular CPC-2-1-23, Licensing Procedure for Spectrum Licences for Terrestrial Services, as amended from time to time.

The licensee must apply in writing to ISED for approval prior to implementing any Deemed Transfer, which will be treated as set out in CPC-2-1-23. The implementation of a Deemed Transfer without the prior approval of ISED will be considered a breach of this condition of licence.

Should the licensee enter into any Agreement that provides for a Prospective Transfer with another holder of a Licence for commercial mobile spectrum (including any Affiliate, agent or representative of the other licence holder), the licensee must apply in writing to ISED for review of the Prospective Transfer within 15 days of entering into the Agreement, which will be treated as set out in CPC-2-1-23. Should ISED issue a decision indicating that the Prospective Transfer is not approved, it will be a breach of this condition of licence for a licensee to remain in an Agreement that provides for the Prospective Transfer for a period of more than 90 days from the date of the decision.

In all cases, the licensee must follow the procedures as outlined in CPC-2-1-23.

All capitalized terms in this section (H4) have the meaning ascribed to them in CPC-2-1-23.

If a set-aside is applied the following would also apply:

The following provision applies to set-aside licences as defined under the Framework.

For the first five years of the licence term, a set-aside licence is not transferable to a set-aside-ineligible entity (as defined in the Framework) with two exceptions:

  1. a Subordinate Licence to a set-aside-ineligible entity may be granted in support of a spectrum sharing agreement provided that the requirements in section 5.6.3 and section 5.6.4 of CPC-2123 are met and that ISED is satisfied that the relevant entities will actively and independently provide wireless services in the applicable licence areas, based on the assessment factors set out in the Framework; and
  2. an exchange of equal amounts of 26, 28 and/or 38 GHz spectrum within the same licence area between a set-aside-eligible entity and a set-aside-ineligible entity may be allowed, subject to the provisions of section 5.6 of CPC-2-1-23.

A set-aside spectrum licence may only be transferred to a set-aside-ineligible licensee after the five-year period set out above and once the licensee has satisfied the mid-term deployment requirement.

If a spectrum cap is applied the following would also apply to all flexible use licences:

For the first five years of the licence term, a licence is not transferable where the Transfer would be contrary to the Spectrum Aggregation Limit established in the Framework with two exceptions:

  1. a Subordinate Licence may be granted in support of a spectrum sharing agreement provided that the requirements in section 5.6.3 and section 5.6.4 of CPC-2123 are met and that ISED is satisfied that the relevant entities will actively and independently provide wireless services in the applicable licence areas, based on the assessment factors set out in the Framework; and
  2. an exchange of equal amounts of 26, 28 and/or 38 GHz spectrum within the same licence area may be allowed, where the result of all the relevant transfers is still in accordance with the Spectrum Aggregation Limit subject to the provisions of section 5.6 of CPC-2-1-23.

H5. Treatment of existing spectrum users

The licensee must comply with the displacement and transition policies set out in the 2019 Decision and as further clarified through this consultation and resulting decision.

H6. Radio station installations

The licensee must comply with Client Procedures Circular CPC-2-0-03, Radiocommunication and Broadcasting Antenna Systems, as amended from time to time.

Provision of technical information: The licensee must provide, and maintain, up-to-date technical information on a particular station or network in accordance with the definitions, criteria, frequency and timelines specified in CPC-2-1-23, as amended from time to time.

H7. Technical considerations, and international and domestic coordination

The licensee must comply on an ongoing basis with the technical aspects of the appropriate Radio Standards Specifications (RSS) and Standard Radio System Plans (SRSP), as amended from time to time. Where applicable, the licensee must use its best efforts to enter into mutually acceptable agreements with other parties for facilitating the reasonable and timely development of their respective systems, and to coordinate with other licensed users in Canada and internationally.

The licensee must comply with the obligations arising from current and future frequency coordination agreements established between Canada and other countries and shall be required to provide information or take actions to implement these obligations as indicated in the applicable SRSP. Although frequency assignments are not subject to site licensing, the licensee may be required through the appropriate SRSP to furnish all necessary technical data for each relevant site.

H8. Lawful interception

The licensee operating as a telecommunication common carrier using the spectrum for voice telephony systems must, from the inception of service, provide for and maintain lawful interception capabilities as authorized by law. The requirements for lawful interception capabilities are provided in the Solicitor General's Enforcement Standards for Lawful Interception of Telecommunications (Rev. Nov. 95). These standards may be amended from time to time.

The licensee may request the Minister to forbear from enforcing certain assistance capability requirements for a limited period of time. The Minister, following consultation with Public Safety Canada, may exercise the power to forbear from enforcing a requirement or requirements where, in the opinion of the Minister, the requirement is not reasonably achievable. Requests for forbearance must include specific details and dates indicating when compliance with the requirement can be expected.

H9. Research and development

The licensee must invest, at a minimum, 2% of its adjusted gross revenues resulting from the use of this licence, averaged over the term of the licence, in eligible research and development (R&D) activities related to telecommunications. Eligible R&D activities are those which meet the definition of scientific research and experimental development adopted in the Income Tax Act, as amended from time to time. Adjusted gross revenues are defined as total service revenues less inter-carrier payments, bad debts, third party commissions, and provincial goods and services taxes collected. The licensee is exempt from R&D expenditure requirements if it, together with all affiliated licensees that are subject to the R&D condition of licence, has less than $1 billion in annual gross operating revenues from the provision of wireless services in Canada, averaged over the term of the licence. For this condition of licence, an affiliate is defined as a person who controls the carrier, or who is controlled by the carrier or by any person who controls the carrier, as per subsection 35(3) of the Telecommunications Act.

H10. Deployment requirements

The licensee will be required to demonstrate to the Minister that the spectrum has been put to use, as specified within the timeframes of its deployment requirements.

Licensees will be required to demonstrate to the Minister that this spectrum has been put to use to actively offer service with the number of stations in each Tier 5 service area as specified in annex D, at 5 and 9.5 years following the initial licence issuance date. A maximum of 30 stations in any single grid cell may be counted towards the deployment requirement of any given licence.

The licensee is required to meet these conditions at all relevant times during the licence term and to continuously offer services throughout the term of the licence in accordance with these requirements. In addition to any other reporting requirements, the licensee must provide the Minister with any documentation or information related to deployment spectrum access or network footprints at the Minister's request. Where, at any point in the licence term, the licensee is not in compliance with its deployment conditions, ISED may invoke various compliance and enforcement measures.

Where a licence is transferred, the requirement for the new licensee to deploy will continue to be based on the initial licence issuance date. 

H11. Mandatory antenna tower and site sharing

The licensee must comply with the mandatory antenna tower and site sharing requirements set out in Client Procedures Circular CPC-2-0-17, Conditions of Licence for Mandatory Roaming and Antenna Tower and Site Sharing and to Prohibit Exclusive Site Arrangements, as amended from time to time.

H12. Mandatory roaming

The licensee must comply with the roaming requirements set out in CPC-2-0-17 as amended from time to time.

H13. Annual reporting

In addition to any reporting requirements required by any CPC, Technical Standard, SRSP or Radio Systems Policy, the licensee must submit an annual report for each year of the licence term, which includes the following information:

  • a statement indicating continued compliance with all conditions of licence
  • an update on the deployment requirements within the area covered by the licence
  • existing audited financial statements with an accompanying auditor's report
  • a statement indicating the annual gross operating revenues from the provision of wireless services in Canada and, where applicable, the annual adjusted gross revenues resulting from the use of this licence, as defined in these conditions of licence
  • a report of the R&D expenditures as set out in these conditions of licence (ISED may request, at its discretion, an audited statement of R&D expenditures with an accompanying auditor's report)
  • supporting financial statements where a licensee is claiming an exemption based on, together with all affiliated licensees that are subject to the R&D condition of licence, it having less than $1 billion in annual gross operating revenues from the provision of wireless services in Canada, averaged over the term of the licence
  • a copy of any existing corporate annual report for the licensee's fiscal year with respect to the authorization
  • other information related to the licence as specified in any notice updating the reporting requirements as issued by ISED

All reports and statements are to be certified by an officer of the company and submitted, in writing, within 120 days of the licensee's fiscal year-end. Confidential information provided will be treated in accordance with subsection 20(1) of the Access to Information Act.

Reports are to be submitted to ISED at the following address:

Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada
Spectrum Management Operations Branch
Manager, Operational Policy
6th Floor, East Tower
235 Queen St
Ottawa ON  K1A 0H5

Email: spectrumoperations-operationsduspectre@ised-isde.gc.ca

H14. Amendments

The Minister retains the discretion to amend these terms and conditions of licence at any time.

Annex I: The clock stage

1. A clock auction with generic blocks is a bidding process that includes two stages: a clock stage and an assignment stage. The clock stage determines the number of generic blocks that a bidder will win for each product and the price for these blocks. The assignment stage determines the specific frequencies that will be assigned to each winning bidder and the additional price for the specific frequencies.

2. ISED is proposing that the mmWave licences would be offered in the 26/28 GHz band and in the 38 GHz band as generic licences in each of the 654 Tier 5 service areas. Before the auction, ISED would specify the supply of blocks in the auction for each band and service area combination. For most band and service area combinations, the supply is proposed to be 16. If, in a given band and service area, some of the blocks are encumbered (by satellite earth station installations or by fixed point-to-multipoint users), the supply will be reduced to accommodate the encumbrance and to ensure that the spectrum offered in the auction consists of contiguous frequency blocks. For information on the reductions to the proposed supply, due to encumbrances, for each band and service area, see annex F.

3. If a set-aside is applied, upon application to participate in the auction, each applicant would be required to indicate whether it is applying as a set-aside-eligible or set-aside-ineligible bidder. Set-aside eligibility will be subject to ISED approval.

4. The future licensing framework decision would determine a conditional set-aside quantity for each band and service area combination. ISED is seeking comment on the conditional set-aside quantities, as described in section 13. ISED is also seeking comment on whether the conditional set-aside quantity should be lower for a band and service area combination where the supply is less than 16.

I1. Clock stage products

5. If a set-aside is not applied, a pair consisting of a band and a service area is referred to as a “product”. Since ISED is proposing that only unencumbered blocks be included in the auction, there would be a single product for each band and service area combination. A product's supply equals the supply of blocks in that band and service area combination.

6. The remainder of this section describes how the clock stage products are determined if a set-aside is applied. ISED is proposing to use a conditional set-aside, which means that the clock stage product will be determined after bidding in Round 1.

7. If a set-aside is applied, the future licensing framework decision would determine a conditional set-aside quantity for each band and service area combination. For instance, if the set-aside is in a single band, there will be a conditional set-aside of 8 blocks in this band (and no conditional set-aside in the other band) for a service area without encumbrances. As another example, if the set-aside is 400 MHz in each of the two bands, there will be a conditional set-aside of 4 blocks in each band for a service area without encumbrances.

8. In Round 1, each bidder indicates the number of blocks it demands for each band and service area combination at the opening bid prices (listed in annex K). A bidder (whether set-aside-eligible or set-aside-ineligible) may indicate a quantity up to the entire supply of blocks in the band and service area.

9. For each band and service area combination with a conditional set-aside, the system then calculates the aggregate demand of set-aside-eligible bidders. The set-aside quantity for that band and service area is set equal to the minimum of the aggregate demand of set-aside-eligible bidders and the conditional set-aside quantity. The open quantity for that band and service area is set equal to the entire supply of blocks in that band and service area minus the set-aside quantity. For example, if the conditional set-aside quantity is 4 blocks, the entire supply is 16 blocks, and in the first round of bidding the aggregate demand of set-aside-eligible bidders is 6 blocks, then for the remainder of the auction, the set-aside quantity will be 4 blocks and the open quantity will be 12 blocks. As another example, if the conditional set-aside quantity is 4 blocks, the entire supply is 16 blocks, and in the first round of bidding the aggregate demand of set-aside-eligible bidders is only 3 blocks, then the set-aside quantity will be 3 blocks and the open quantity will be 13 blocks for the remainder of the auction.

10. If a set-aside is applied, the combination of a service area, a band, and a set-aside status (open or set-aside) is referred to as a “product.” A band and service area combination has two products (set-aside and open) if the set-aside quantity, as determined after Round 1, is strictly between 0 and the supply of blocks in that band and service area combination. A band and service area combination has only an open product if the set-aside quantity, as determined after Round 1, is equal to 0; this is the case if either the conditional set-aside quantity is 0 or the aggregate demand of set-aside-eligible bidders is 0. For example, if an 800 MHz set-aside in the 26/28 GHz band is adopted, then, in every service area, there would only be an open product in the 38 GHz band. A band and service area combination has only a set-aside product if the set-aside quantity, as determined after Round 1, is equal to the entire supply of blocks in that band and service area combination. This could occur for a band and service area with encumbrances if ISED sets a conditional set-aside quantity equal to the supply of blocks for the band and service area and the aggregate demand of set-aside-eligible bidders in Round 1 is greater than or equal to the supply.

11. In the case of a band and service area combination with a single product (set-aside or open), the product's supply equals the entire supply in that band and service area combination. In the case of a band and service area combination with only set-aside product, the set-aside-eligible bidders can collectively win up to the supply of blocks in this band and service area combination and the set-aside-ineligible bidders cannot win any spectrum in this band and service area combination. In the case of a band and service area combination with only open product, the set-aside-eligible bidders and set-aside-ineligible bidders can both win spectrum in this band and service area combination and they can collectively win up to the supply of blocks in this band and service area combination.

12. In the case of a band and service area combination with two products (set-aside and open), an initial supply and a maximum supply is defined for each of the products, based on the first round of bidding. The initial supply of the set-aside product is equal to the set-aside quantity as determined after Round 1 and the initial supply of the open product is equal to the entire supply of blocks minus the set-aside quantity.

13. The maximum supply of a product indicates the maximum number of blocks that can be won by bidders bidding for that product. The maximum supply of the open product equals its initial supply. That is, set-aside-ineligible bidders can collectively win up to the initial supply of the open product. The maximum supply of the set-aside product equals the supply of blocks in that band and service area combination. That is, set-aside-eligible bidders can collectively win up to the entire supply of blocks in the band and service area combination.

I2. Clock stage overview

14. The clock stage consists of a sequence of clock rounds. The licences are auctioned simultaneously over multiple clock rounds.

15. An activity rule is used to improve price discovery and maintain auction progress. In any round, a bidder is not allowed to submit a collection of bids if the associated eligibility points exceed the bidder's eligibility for the round.

16. If an 800 MHz cross-band cap is applied, a bidder is not allowed to submit bids that exceed the cap in any round. This implies that, for a given service area, the sum of the bidder's bids for the two bands, including prior 38 GHz holdings, cannot exceed 8 blocks.

17. If a set-aside is not applied, in Round 1, each bidder indicates the number of blocks it demands for each product at the opening bid prices.

18. If a conditional set-aside is applied, in Round 1, each bidder indicates the number of blocks it demands for each band and service area combination at the opening bid prices, and the clock stage products are determined after bidding in Round 1, as described in section I1 above.

19. After each round, bids are processed to determine the processed demands and the posted prices for the round.

20. If a set-aside is not applied, a bidder's processed demand for a product for Round 1 equals the bidder's Round 1 demand for the product.

21. If a set-aside is applied, processed demands for Round 1 are determined as follows. In the case of a band and service area combination with only an open product, a bidder's processed demand equals the bidder's Round 1 demand in that band and service area combination. In the case of a band and service area combination that includes a set-aside product (and may or may not include an open product), set-aside-eligible bidders would have processed demand for the set-aside product and set-aside-ineligible bidders would have processed demand for the open product (if an open product exists). The processed demand of a set-aside-eligible bidder for the set-aside product equals the bidder's Round 1 demand in that band and service area combination. The processed demand of a set-aside-ineligible bidder for the open product equals the minimum of the bidder's Round 1 demand in that band and service area combination and the maximum supply for the open product, as determined after Round 1.

22. The posted price of a product after Round 1 equals the opening price for the corresponding band and service area combination.

23. Starting in Round 2, a range of prices is associated with each product. The start-of-round price is the lowest price in the range and equals the posted price of the previous round. The clock price is the highest price in the range and is set as described in section I10 of this annex. A bidder can bid either to maintain its demand for a product at the round's clock price or to request to change its demand at a price between the start-of-round price and the clock price (inclusive).

24. If a set-aside is not applied, each bidder can bid on any product (subject to the activity rule), and the quantity of blocks in a bid for a product cannot exceed the product's supply.

25. If a set-aside is applied, set-aside-eligible bidders can bid on set-aside products and, for a band and service area combination for which there is no set-aside product, set-aside-eligible bidders can bid on the open product. Set-aside ineligible bidders can bid only on open products. For a band and service area combination with a single product, the quantity of blocks in a bid for that product cannot exceed the product's supply. For an encumbrance category and service area combination for which there is both an open product and a set-aside product, a set-aside-eligible bidder's bid for the set-aside product cannot exceed the maximum supply of the set-aside product, while a set-aside-ineligible bidder's bid for the open product cannot exceed the maximum supply of the open product.

26. After Round 2 and each subsequent round, bids are processed to determine the processed demands and the posted prices for the round as described in sections I5 to I8 of this annex. 

I3. Intra-round bids to change demand

27. A bidder will be able to make intra-round bids by indicating a price between (including both end points) the start-of-round price and the clock price of the round at which its demand for blocks in a product changes. Bid amounts for intra-round bids must be:

  • a multiple of $10 for bid amounts below $10,000;
  • a multiple of $100 for bid amounts between $10,000 and $100,000; and
  • a multiple of $1,000 for bid amounts above $100,000.

28. In placing an intra-round bid, a bidder will indicate a specific price, and a quantity of blocks it demands if the price for blocks in the product should increase beyond that price. A bidder may submit up to five intra-round bids for a product in a round as long as the quantities in those bids are monotonic in price. Therefore, if all of the bids submitted by a bidder in a round for a product are sorted in ascending order of price, the corresponding quantities must all either increase or decrease starting from the bidder's processed demand from the previous round. For example, if the bidder's processed demand is 4 blocks at the start-of-round price of $100,000 and the clock price for this round is $120,000, the bidder can submit a bid to reduce its demand to 2 blocks at the price of $105,000 and another bid to further reduce its demand to 0 blocks at the price of $115,000.

29. Intra-round bids will be optional: a bidder may choose to express its demands only at the clock prices. Permitting intra-round bidding will enable ISED to set relatively large price increments, thereby speeding up the auction, without running the risk that a jump in the clock price will overshoot the market clearing price—the point at which demand for blocks equals the available supply.

30. A bidder can express its demands at the clock price or at an intra-round price. Bid quantities can represent an increase or a decrease over the bidder's previous demands for blocks in a product. The auction system will apply a bid to change demand to the maximum extent possible as described in section I7 of this annex. If it is not possible for the auction system to apply the bid in its entirety, the bid may be applied partially.

31. A bid to reduce demand at an intra-round price indicates that a bidder is willing to pay up to the intra-round bid price for a quantity of blocks that is unchanged from its previously demanded quantity. At the intra-round bid price, the bidder is willing to accept the unchanged quantity, the changed quantity, or any quantity in between. At a price above the intra-round bid up to the clock price for the round (or, if the bidder submitted more intra-round bids for the product at higher prices, up to the bid price of the next intra-round bid), the bidder is willing to accept the changed quantity indicated by the intra-round bid.

32. A bid requesting a reduction in demand will be applied in full if there is sufficient demand. That is, for a band and service area combination with a single product, the auction system will apply the reduction provided that there is sufficient aggregate demand at the time the bid is considered during bid processing to allow the reduction to be applied without the aggregate demand of all bidders falling below the supply. If a set-aside is applied, for a band and service area combination with two products, the auction system will apply the reduction provided that there is sufficient aggregate demand at the time the bid is considered during bid processing to allow the reduction to be applied without the aggregate demand of set-aside-eligible bidders falling below the set-aside quantity and without the aggregate demand of all bidders falling below the entire supply. If there is some excess demand, but not enough to grant the full requested reduction, the auction system will partially apply the reduction, thereby reducing the bidder's demand by fewer than the requested number of blocks.

33. A bid requesting an increase in demand will be applied subject to the bidder's eligibility and the cross-band spectrum cap, if such a cap is adopted. That is, a bid will not be applied in full if it would cause the bidder's processed activity to exceed the bidder's eligibility or, in the event that a cross-band spectrum cap is adopted, if it would cause the bidder to exceed the cap. If a bid to increase demand cannot be applied in full, the auction system will apply the increase to the extent possible.

I4. Bid processing

34. Sections I5 to I8 of this annex describe how bids are processed after a round, for a round after Round 1. First, missing bids are included as described in section I5. Then, the order in which bids to change demand will be processed is determined as described in section I6. Bids are processed in that order to determine the processed demand for each bidder and each product for the round, as described in section I7. Finally, the posted prices for the round are calculated as described in section I8.

I5. Missing bids

35. For each product for which the bidder had positive processed demand in the previous round, if the bidder does not submit a bid for that product during the current round, the bidder will be deemed to have placed a bid to reduce its demand for that product to 0 blocks at the start-of-round price. All such missing bids are processed in the same way as bids submitted by a bidder to purchase a zero quantity of blocks in this product at the start-of-round price.

I6. Order of processing bids

36. The price point of a bid for a product generally indicates the percentage of the distance between the start-of-round price and clock price for the product. That is, the price point is equal to the bid price minus the start-of-round price, divided by the clock price minus the start-of-round price. This definition of price point is used for all bids in the case that a set-aside is not applied. If a set-aside is applied, this definition of price point is used for bids for open products as well as for bids for set-aside products in a band and service area combination without an open product. In these cases, the price point of a bid is greater than or equal to 0% and less than or equal to 100%. For example, if, for an open product, the start-of-round price is $100,000 and the clock price is $105,000, then a bid for the open product at $102,000 will have a price point of (102,000-100,000)/(105,000-100,000) = 40%.

37. The case of a set-aside product, when an open product is also offered in the same band and service area is described in the following paragraphs. Because of the way that bids are processed, the start-of-round price of a set-aside product can never exceed the start-of-round price of the open product. Moreover, clock prices are set in a way that ensures that the clock price of a set-aside product never exceeds the clock price of the open product. The price point of a bid for a set-aside product is defined based on whether the price range for the set-aside product overlaps the price range for the open product.

38. For a set-aside product whose price range overlaps with the price range of the open product (i.e. if the start-of-round price of the open product is less than the clock price of the set-aside product), the price point of a bid is based on the price range of the open product. In particular, the price point of a bid for the set-aside product is equal to the bid price minus the start-of-round price for the open product, divided by the clock price of the open product minus the start-of-round price of the open product. Thus, it is possible, when the start-of-round price for the set-aside product is less than the start-of-round price for the open product, for the price point of a bid for the set-aside product to be a negative number. For example, suppose that for the open product, the start-of-round price is $100,000 and the clock price is $105,000, and, for the set-aside product, the start-of-round price is $99,000 and the clock price is $105,000. Then a bid for the set-aside product at $99,500 will have a price point of (99,500-100,000)/(105,000-100,000) = -10%. However, if the set-aside and open products have the exact same price range for the round, then the price point of a bid for the set-aside product will be between 0% and 100% (inclusive).

39. For a set-aside product whose price range does not overlap the price range of the open product (i.e. if the start-of-round price of the open product is at least the clock price of the set-aside product), the price point of a bid for the set-aside product is equal to the bid price minus the set-aside clock price, divided by the set-aside clock price minus the set-aside start-of-round price. In this case, a bid for the set-aside product has a price point that is greater than or equal to -100% and less than or equal to 0%, which will imply that bids for the set-aside product will be processed before bids for the open product. For example, suppose that for the open product, the start-of-round price is $100,000 and the clock price is $105,000, and, for the set-aside product, the start-of-round price is $80,000 and the clock price is $85,000. Then, a bid for the set-aside product at $82,000 will have a price point of (82,000-85,000)/(85,000-80,000) = -60%.

40. Bids to change demand are processed in increasing order of price point. That is, a bid with a lower price point is considered to have higher priority than a bid with a higher price point. If a set-aside is applied, for the case where the clock price of the set-aside product is less than or equal to the start-of-round price of the open product, note that a bid for the set-aside product and a bid for the open product could both have price points of 0%. In this event, the set-aside 0% bid will be given higher priority than the open 0% bid, for purposes of bid processing. This set-aside 0% bid will also be given a higher priority than a 0% bid for another set-aside product if the clock price of the other set-aside product is greater than the start-of-round price of the corresponding open product. Pseudo-random numbers are used to break any ties.

I7. Processing bids to determine the processed demands

41. Bids to maintain demand are always applied during bid processing, whereas bids to change demand are applied to the maximum extent possible.

42. The bid processing algorithm described in this section maintains a queue of all bids to change demand that have not been applied in their entirety. Within the queue, the highest-priority bid to change demand that has not yet been considered is processed. The algorithm checks to what extent the bid can be applied using the most recently determined processed demands.

43. A bid to increase demand is applied to the maximum extent possible while ensuring that:

  1. the bidder's processed activity (after applying the bid) does not exceed its eligibility for the round; and
  2. in the event that a cross-band spectrum cap is adopted, the bidder's processed demands for the service area across the 26/28 GHz and 38 GHz bands (plus any prior holdings of 38 GHz spectrum licences) do not exceed the cap of 800 MHz.

Note that it may not be possible to apply a bid because of insufficient bidding eligibility if another bid submitted by the bidder, requesting a reduction, is not applied due to insufficient aggregate demand, thereby not freeing up eligibility points needed to support the requested bid to increase demand for another product. This can occur even though the bidder's submitted activity does not exceed its eligibility. Moreover, it may not be possible to apply a bid because of the cross-band spectrum cap if another bid submitted by the bidder, requesting a reduction for the other band in the same service area, is not applied due to insufficient aggregate demand.

44. For a product that is the unique product in that band and service area combination, a bid to reduce demand is applied to the maximum extent possible while ensuring that the reduction does not cause aggregate demand to fall below supply for that product (or to fall further below supply, if it is already below supply).  

45. If a set-aside is applied, when there is both a set-aside product and an open product in the same band and service area combination, the treatment of bids to reduce demand is described in paragraphs below.

46. A bid to reduce demand for a set-aside product is applied to the maximum extent possible while ensuring the following:

  1. the aggregate demand for the set-aside product does not drop below the product's initial supply; and
  2. the aggregate demand for the open and set-aside products does not drop below the supply for that band and service area combination.

If either the aggregate demand for the set-aside product equals the initial supply of the set-aside product or the aggregate demand for the open and set-aside products is less than or equal to the supply for that band and service area, then a bid to reduce demand for the set-aside product is not applied at all. Note that, because the initial supply of the set-aside product is set to be less than or equal to the aggregate demand of set-aside-eligible bidders after Round 1 (as described in section I1), the processing rules guarantee that the aggregate demand of set-aside-eligible bidders can never be less than the initial supply of the set-aside product.

47. If the price ranges overlap, a bid to reduce demand for the open product is applied to the maximum extent possible while ensuring that the aggregate demand for the open and set-aside products does not drop below the supply for that band and service area combination. If the aggregate demand for the open and set-aside products is less than or equal to the supply for that band and service area combination, then the bid to reduce demand for the open product is not applied at all.

48. If the price ranges do not overlap, a bid to reduce demand for an open product is applied to the maximum extent possible while ensuring that the aggregate demand for the open product does not drop below the initial supply of the open product. If the aggregate demand for the open product is less than or equal to the initial supply of the open product, then a bid to reduce demand for the open product is not applied at all.

49. If a bid is not applied in its entirety, then it is placed in the queue so that the remaining part may be applied later. 

50. Whenever a bid is applied either partially or in its entirety, the queue is re-tested to determine whether it is possible to apply any bids in the queue (either partially or entirely) according to the conditions described above; if so, the highest-priority bid is applied to the maximum extent possible. When a bid has been applied in its entirety, it is removed from the queue; otherwise, it is kept in the queue so that the remaining part may be applied later. The re-testing of the queue is iterated until no bids remaining in the queue can be applied (either partially or entirely) while satisfying the conditions above. Then the next bid from the round is processed, until (1) all bids from the round have been processed, and (2) no bids in the queue can be applied. At that point, all bids remaining in the queue are discarded.

51. The demands of a bidder following the processing of the bids for the round are referred to as its processed demands.

I8. Determining the posted prices

52. After the round's processed demands have been determined, the auction system calculates the posted price of each product. 

53. For a product that is the unique product in that band and service area combination, the posted price is set as follows:

  1. If the aggregate demand for the product exceeds the product's supply, the posted price will be set equal to the product's clock price for the round.
  2. If the aggregate demand for the product equals the product's supply and at least one bid to reduce demand for the product was applied (either entirely or partially), the posted price will be set equal to the highest bid price among all bids to reduce demand for the product that were applied (either entirely or partially). In other words, the posted price will be the price at which a reduction caused demand to equal supply. 
  3. If the aggregate demand for the product is less than or equal to the product's supply and no bid to reduce demand for the product was applied (either entirely or partially), the posted price will be set to be equal to the round's start-of-round price for the product.

54. The remainder of this section describes how posted prices are determined if a set-aside is applied and there is both a set-aside product and an open product in the band and service area combination. In that case, the posted prices of the open product and the set-aside product are generally set as described in paragraph 53 above, assuming that for the purposes of paragraph 53 the supply of a product is the product's initial supply. There are two exceptions, dealing with the interplay between open and set-aside products when the price ranges of the two products overlap. These exceptions are described in the following two paragraphs.

55. Exception for open products: Suppose that the price range of the open product overlaps the price range of the set-aside product for the round. Then, the posted price of the open product is set as described in paragraph 53, except that in parts (b) and (c), in addition to bids to reduce demand for the open product, bids to reduce demand for the set-aside product with bid prices within the price range of the open product are also taken into account. Furthermore, if the aggregate demand for the set-aside product is greater than its initial supply, for purposes of paragraph 53, the open product's “supply” equals the supply of blocks in the band and service area minus the aggregate demand for the set-aside product.

56. Exception for set-aside products: An exception in setting the posted price for the set-aside product applies if the following three conditions hold: (i) the price range of the open product overlaps the price range of the set-aside product for the round, (ii) the aggregate demand for the set-aside product exceeds the initial supply of the set-aside product, and (iii) the aggregate demand for the open and set-aside products is less than or equal to the supply of blocks in that band and service area combination. Then, the posted price of the set-aside product is set equal to the posted price of the open product (which is calculated as described above).

I9. Bid processing examples

57. Example of a reduction in demand for a product that is the unique product in a given band and service area combination: Consider a band and service area combination with a unique product and suppose that the product's supply of 16 blocks (this could be a product in a band where a set-aside is not applied). In Round 2, the product's start-of-round price is $100,000 and the product's clock price is $110,000. There are three bidders with processed demands for the product after Round 2: Bidder 1 has a processed demand of 6 blocks, Bidder 2 has a processed demand of 6 blocks, and Bidder 3 has a processed demand of 5 blocks. Then, the product's aggregate demand after Round 2 is equal to 17 blocks. In this case, which corresponds to part (a) of paragraph 53, the product's posted price for Round 2 will equal $110,000 (the Round 2 clock price), and the product's start-of-round price in Round 3 will be $110,000. Suppose that the product's clock price in Round 3 equals $121,000. In Round 3, Bidder 1 submits a bid to reduce its demand for the product to 5 blocks at $120,000, and Bidders 2 and 3 maintain their demands at the Round 3 clock price. Suppose that no other bids are submitted for the product in Round 3. Then, the reduction bid of Bidder 1 will be applied, and the Round 3 processed demands for the product will be 5 blocks for Bidder 1, 6 blocks for Bidder 2, and 5 blocks for Bidder 3. In this case, which corresponds to part (b) of paragraph 53, the product's posted price for Round 3 will equal the price of the reduction bid by Bidder 1, which is $120,000. This is the price at which a bidder's reduction caused aggregate demand to equal supply. The product's start-of-round price for Round 4 will equal $120,000. Suppose that the product's clock price for Round 4 equals $132,000. In Round 4, each of the three bidders submits a bid to maintain its demand at the Round 4 clock price, and no other bidders submit bids for the product. Then, the aggregate demand for the product after Round 4 will remain equal to the product's supply. In this case, which corresponds to part (c) of paragraph 53, the posted price for Round 4 will equal the posted price for Round 3, which is $120,000. Note that this is the price at which a bidder's reduction had caused aggregate demand to equal supply (in a previous round).

58. Example of a reduction in demand and price point priority when there is both a set-aside product and an open product in the same band and service area combination: Suppose that in a given round, the start-of-round price of the set-aside product equals the start-of-round price of the open product. The start-of-round price is $100,000 and the price increment is 10%. Therefore, the round's clock price is $110,000 for both the open and the set-aside products. The price of $100,000 corresponds to the 0% price point and the price of $110,000 corresponds to the 100% price point. Further, suppose that the aggregate demand for the set-aside product exceeds its initial supply by one block and the aggregate demand for the open product is equal to the initial supply of the open product. During this round, a set-aside-eligible bidder bids to reduce its demand by one block at the price of $104,000 (the 40% price point) and a set-aside-ineligible bidder bids to reduce its demand by one block at the price of $106,000 (the 60% price point). Since bids are processed in increasing order of price point, the bid of the set-aside-eligible bidder will be processed first. This bid will be applied because (a) the aggregate demand for the set-aside product exceeds the product's initial supply by one block and (b) the aggregate demand for the open and set-aside products exceeds the supply for the band and service area combination by one. Then, the aggregate demand for the set-aside product equals its initial supply and the aggregate demand for the open product also equals its initial supply. The bid processing algorithm will consider the bid to reduce demand by the set-aside-ineligible bidder. This bid is not applied because the aggregate demand for the open and set-aside products is equal to the supply for that band and service area. If there are no other bids for the open and the set-aside products in this band and service area, the posted price for both the open product and the set-aside product will be set at $104,000. This will be the next round's start-of-round price for both products.

59. Example of a demand increase and a reduction in the same round when there is both a set-aside product and an open product in the same band and service area combination: As in the previous example, suppose that in a given round, the start-of-round price of the set-aside product equals the start-of-round price of the open product. The start-of-round price is $100,000 and the price increment is 10%. The demand for the set-aside product exceeds the product's initial supply by one block and the demand for the open product equals the initial supply of the open product. During this round, a set-aside-eligible bidder bids to reduce its demand by one block at the price of $104,000 and a set-aside-ineligible bidder bids to reduce its demand by one block at the price of $106,000. Also, another set-aside-ineligible bidder bids to increase its demand by one block at the price of $108,000. As in the previous example, the bid of the set-aside-eligible bidder will be processed first and will be applied. The bid of the first set-aside-ineligible bidder will be processed next, but will not be applied and will be placed in the queue. The request of the other set-aside-ineligible bidder to increase demand will be processed next and will be applied (assuming that the bidder has sufficient eligibility at that time and that the resulting processed demands do not violate the cross-band spectrum cap, if adopted). The bid in the queue will be considered next and now can be applied. If there are no other bids for the open and the set-aside products in this band and service area, the posted price of the set-aside product will be set at $104,000 and the posted price of the open product will be set at $106,000.

60. Example of a reduction in demand when the price ranges of the set-aside product and open product overlap: Suppose that the start-of-round price for the set-aside product is $100,000, the start-of-round price for the open product is $105,000 and the price increment is 20%. This implies that the round's clock price for the open product will be set at $126,000 and the round's clock price for the set-aside product will also be set at $126,000 (so as to be equal to the clock price of the open product, as described in section I10 of this annex). Further, suppose that the demand for the set-aside product exceeds the initial supply by one block and the demand for the open product equals the initial supply of the open product. During this round, a set-aside-eligible bidder bids to reduce its demand by one block at the price of $108,000 (or about the 14% price point) and a set-aside-ineligible bidder bids to reduce its demand by one block at the price of $106,000 (or about the 5% price point). Since bids are processed in increasing order of price point, the bid of the set-aside-ineligible bidder will be processed first. After demand is reduced by the set-aside-ineligible bidder, there will be no overall excess demand in this band and service area combination. So, the request of the set-aside-eligible bidder to reduce its quantity will be denied. If there are no other bids for the open and the set-aside products in this band and service area combination, the posted price for both products will be set at $106,000. Note that in this example, after the round, the aggregate demand for the set-aside product exceeds its initial supply by one block and there is no excess demand in this band and service area combination. 

61. Example of a reduction in demand when the price ranges of the set-aside product and open product do not overlap: Suppose that the start-of-round price for the set-aside product is $100,000, the start-of-round price for the open product is $120,000 and the price increment is 10%. This implies that the clock price for the set-aside product should be set at $110,000 and the clock price of the open product should be set at $132,000. Further, suppose that the demand for the set-aside product exceeds the initial supply by one block and the demand for the open product is equal to the initial supply of the open product. The price of $120,000 corresponds to the bottom of the price range for the open product and hence the 0% price point; the price of $132,000 corresponds to the top of the price range for the open product and hence the 100% price point. The price of $100,000 corresponds to the bottom of the price range for the set-aside product and hence the 100% price point; the price of $110,000 corresponds to the top of the price range for the set-aside product and hence the 0% price point. During this round, a set-aside-eligible bidder bids to reduce its demand by one block at the price of $108,000 (or at the -20% price point) and a set-aside-ineligible bidder bids to reduce its demand by one block at the price of $122,000 (or at about the 17% price point). The bid of the set-aside-eligible bidder will be processed first and will be applied. The bid of the set-aside-ineligible bidder will not be applied (it would not be applied even if the set-aside-eligible bidder had not bid to reduce its demand at a lower price point). If there are no other bids for the open and the set-aside products in this band and service area, the posted price for the set-aside product for the next round will be set at $108,000 and the posted price for the open product will be set at $120,000.

I10. Next round's clock prices

62. A product's start-of-round price for the next round is equal to the posted price.

63. The incrementing policy generally works as follows. The price increment for a product is set to x% of the product's start-of-round price, where x% is the increment percentage for the round (proposed to be in the range 1-20%). The round's clock price is then equal to the start-of-round price plus the price increment. Prices below $1,000 will be rounded up to the nearest $10; prices between $1,000 and $10,000 will be rounded up to the nearest $100; and prices above $10,000 will be rounded up to the nearest $1,000.

64. However, when there is both a set-aside product and an open product in the same band and service area combination, if the incrementing policy would cause the clock price of the set-aside product to be greater than the start-of-round price of the open product and less than the clock price of the open product, then the clock price of the open product is calculated according to the incrementing policy described above and the clock price of the set-aside product is set equal to the clock price of the open product.

65. Observe that the posted price of the set-aside product can never exceed the posted price of the open product. Therefore, the next round's clock price of the set-aside product can never exceed the clock price of the open product.

I11. Information in the clock rounds

66. Following every clock round, bidders will be provided with information on their own bidding activity from previous rounds and their eligibility for the next round. In addition, each bidder will be informed of the aggregate demand and the posted price for each product from the previous round and the clock price of each product for the next round. Bidders will not be informed about the individual bids submitted by other bidders or about the remaining eligibility of other bidders.

I12. Eligibility points

67. Each product has been assigned a specific number of eligibility points in proportion to the opening bid price of the licence. One eligibility point has been assigned for each $100 of opening bid prices. Annex K of this consultation lists the eligibility points associated with each product. All products in a service area will have the same number of eligibility points, unless encumbered products are also offered in the auction.

68. Eligibility points are used in the determination of the pre-auction financial deposits and in the activity rules applied during the auction, which influence the bids that bidders can submit. In its application to participate, each potential bidder must indicate the total number of “points” worth of licences on which it wishes to bid and submit a corresponding financial deposit. A bidder's initial eligibility defines an upper limit on the total number of eligibility points for which the bidder can bid in a round. As in past spectrum auctions, bidders begin each clock round with a set number of eligibility points, which determines their maximum activity level for the given clock round.

69. Bidders will not be able to increase their eligibility points after the application deadline to participate in the auction.

I13. Activity rule

70. In any round, a bidder will not be allowed to submit a collection of bids if the eligibility points associated with the bids exceed the bidder's eligibility for the round.

71. In order to maintain its eligibility from the previous round, the bidder's activity must correspond to a certain percentage of its eligibility for that round. This percentage is called the “activity requirement.” ISED will set the activity requirement between 90% and 100% in all clock rounds, and will retain the discretion to change the activity requirement within that range. The precise figure for the initial activity requirement will be communicated to all qualified bidders before the auction begins. The activity requirement may change during the auction at ISED's discretion. Bidders will be notified prior to these changes taking effect.

72. A bidder's submitted activity for a round is equal to the eligibility points associated with its submitted demands for the round before these demands have been processed. In other words, a bidder's submitted activity level reflects the bidder's demands before they are applied by the auction system during bid processing. A bidder's processed activity for a round is equal to the eligibility points associated with its processed demands after the bids for the round have been processed. In other words, a bidder's processed activity level will reflect its demands as applied by the auction system during bid processing.

73. In Round 1, a bidder's eligibility is determined by the number of points acquired with its financial deposit.

74. In Round 2, a bidder's eligibility is determined by its submitted activity in Round 1, that is, the eligibility points associated with its submitted demands in Round 1, divided by the activity requirement (e.g. divided by 0.95, if the activity requirement is 95%) and rounded down to a whole number. Further, the bidder's eligibility for Round 2 is not allowed to exceed the bidder's eligibility for Round 1. Mathematically, a bidder's eligibility for Round 2 is defined as the minimum of:

  1. the bidder's eligibility for Round 1; and
  2. SA(1) / AR(1), rounded down to a whole number;

where SA(1) denotes the bidder's submitted activity for Round 1, and AR(1) denotes the activity requirement for Round 1.

75. In subsequent rounds, a bidder's eligibility is determined by its processed activity and its submitted activity. Specifically, a bidder's eligibility for the next round is determined by: the maximum of its processed activity in the current round; and the minimum of its processed activity in the previous round and its submitted activity in the current round. This maximum is divided by the activity requirement and rounded down to a whole number. Further, the bidder's eligibility for the next round is not allowed to exceed the bidder's eligibility for the current round. Mathematically, a bidder's eligibility for Round t+1, where t+1>2, is defined as the minimum of:

  1. the bidder's eligibility for Round t; and
  2. max{PA(t), min[PA(t-1), SA(t)]} / AR(t), rounded down to a whole number;

where PA(t) denotes the bidder's processed activity for Round t, SA(t) denotes the bidder's submitted activity for Round t and AR(t) denotes the activity requirement for Round t.

76. Examples of the activity rule in the clock rounds are described below, in paragraphs 77 to 80.

77. Example of maintaining demand: In Round 5, the activity requirement is 95% and the eligibility of Bidder X is 620 eligibility points. In Round 4, the processed activity of Bidder X is 600 points. In Round 5, Bidder X is bidding to maintain its demand on 600 points worth of licences and does not submit any bids to change demand. Therefore, the bidder's processed activity after the round will be 600 points (because bids to maintain demand are always applied during bid processing). That is, the bidder's processed activity in Round 5 is equal to the bidder's submitted activity in Round 5. An application of the formula from paragraph 75 (b) yields 631 points. Thus, the bidder will maintain its Round 5 eligibility (620 points) for the next round.

78. Example of reducing demand: In Round 6, the activity requirement is 95% and the eligibility of Bidder Y is 2,400 eligibility points. In Round 5, the processed activity of Bidder Y is 2,280 points. Suppose that, in Round 6, Bidder Y submits bids to reduce its demand for some products and that if all these reductions are applied during bid processing, its processed activity will be only 1,700 points. If all of the bidder's bids to reduce demand are applied during bid processing, then the bidder's eligibility in the next round will be 1,789 points (1,700 divided by the activity requirement and rounded down—i.e. 1,700/0.95). If some of the bidder's bids to reduce demand are not applied during bid processing and the bidder's processed activity for the round is 2,000, then its eligibility in the next round will be 2,105 points (2,000 divided by the activity requirement and rounded down—i.e. 2,000/0.95).

79. Example where submitted activity exceeds processed activity: In Round 7, the activity requirement is 100% and the eligibility of Bidder Z is 600 eligibility points. In Round 6, the processed activity of Bidder Z is also 600 points. Products A, B, and C have 200, 400 and 600 eligibility points respectively. The bidder currently has processed demand of 1 block for product A and 1 block for product B. The bidder submits the following bids: a bid to reduce its demand for A to 0 blocks; a bid to reduce its demand for B to 0 blocks; and a bid to increase its demand for C to 1 block. If all three bids are applied during bid processing, then the bidder's processed activity will be 600 and thus the bidder will maintain its eligibility after this round. If the bid to reduce demand for A is applied but the bid to reduce demand for B is not applied due to insufficient excess demand, then the bid to increase demand for C cannot be applied because that would cause the bidder's processed activity to exceed its eligibility for the round. In that case, the bidder's processed activity will be 400 but the bidder's eligibility in the next round will be 600 points because the bidder's submitted activity for Round 7 and the bidder's processed activity for Round 6 are both equal to 600 points. That is, an application of the formula from paragraph 75 (b) yields 600 points.

80. In continuation of the previous example, suppose that in Round 8, Bidder Z again submits a bid to reduce its demand for B to 0 blocks; and a bid to increase its demand for C to 1 block. If the bid to reduce demand for B is not applied again due to insufficient excess demand, the bidder's eligibility in Round 9 will be 400 points (400 divided by the activity requirement—i.e. 400/1). However, if in Round 8, Bidder Z submits a bid to increase its demand for A to 1 block and to maintain its demand for B for 1 block (i.e. if the bidder chooses to return to its bids as they were at the start of Round 7), this bidder will have enough eligibility to submit these bids and will keep its eligibility for Round 9 at 600 points.

I14. Conclusion of bidding in the clock stage

81. If a set-aside is not applied, the clock stage will conclude for all products in all service areas after the first round in which, following bid processing, the aggregate demand for each product is less than or equal to its supply. This round is referred to as the final clock round.

82. If a set-aside is applied, the clock stage will conclude for all products in all service areas after the first round in which, after the bids have been processed, the aggregate demand for each open product is less than or equal to its initial supply and there is no excess demand for blocks in any band in any service area. This round is referred to as the final clock round. At this point, ISED will announce to bidders that the clock rounds have ended and that the auction will proceed to the assignment stage (see annex J).

I15. Information at the end of the clock rounds

83. At the end of the clock rounds, each bidder will know how many blocks it has won in each product and the associated price. The price for a generic block in a product will be the product's posted price for the final clock round.

84. At this point, bidders will know with certainty the number of licences in each product that they have won; however, given that these are generic licences, they will not necessarily know the specific licences that they have won.

Annex J: The assignment stage

1. After the conclusion of the clock stage, the auction will advance to the assignment stage, where the specific frequencies for the generic licences will be determined. Bidders that have won one or more generic licences in the clock stage will have the option to participate in the assignment stage.

2. In section 11.1, ISED has proposed that, in service areas without encumbrances, the following frequency blocks will be included in the auction:

  1. for the 26/28 GHz band, blocks C, D, E, F, G, H, J, K, L, M, N, P, Q, R, S, and T
  2. for the 38 GHz band, blocks J, K, L, M, N, P, Q, R, S, T, U, V, W, X, Y, and Z

Note that blocks are labelled in ascending order of frequencies using the letters of the alphabet except for I and O.

3. The geographic unit for bidding in the assignment stage will be the “assignment area”. An assignment area may comprise a single Tier 5 service area or a combination of two or more Tier 5 service areas that satisfy the criteria of paragraph 8 (or paragraph 9, if the two bands are assigned sequentially). The assignment of specific frequencies determined for an assignment area will apply to each and every service area in this assignment area.

4. The assignment stage will consist of a sequence of assignment rounds. In each assignment round, winning bidders will be presented with a set of options available to them for the bands and the assignment areas being assigned in the round.

5. Winning bidders do not have to place bids in the assignment stage if they do not have an assignment preference, as they are guaranteed the number of generic licences that they have won in the clock stage. Each bidder has both a right and an obligation to obtain one of the frequency range options presented to it for each band and assignment area where the bidder has winnings. Each bidder will be assigned these blocks only in a contiguous manner within each band in any given assignment area. 

6. Considering that there are two separate bands in the mmWave spectrum auction—the 26/28 GHz band and the 38 GHz band—ISED is consulting on whether to assign the two bands for a given assignment area in the same round (Option 1) or sequentially (Option 2), as described in section 15.8. This annex is written assuming that the two bands are assigned in the same round for a given assignment area, but also discusses where the procedures would differ if the two bands are assigned sequentially. 

J1. Proposed assignment areas

7. In support of simplifying the assignment stage and facilitating the assignment of contiguous spectrum across service areas, two or more Tier 5 service areas will be combined into an assignment area when certain conditions hold.

8. Under Option 1, two or more Tier 5 service areas will be combined into an assignment area if the following conditions all hold:

  1. the Tier 5 service areas are in the same Tier 3 service area;
  2. for each of these Tier 5 service areas, the same frequency blocks are available in the auction in each of the bands; and
  3. for each of these Tier 5 service areas, the same bidders won the same number of blocks in each band.

9. Under Option 2, two or more Tier 5 service areas will be combined into an assignment area for a given band (26/28 GHz or 38 GHz) if the following conditions all hold:

  1. the Tier 5 service areas are in the same Tier 3 service area; and
  2. for each of these Tier 5 service areas, the same bidders won the same number of blocks in the band under consideration.

10. Example where service areas are combined into an assignment area: Table J1 below provides an example of two service areas that are combined into an assignment area. Service areas I and II are in the same Tier 3 area and do not have any encumbrances (thus, the supply is equal to 16 for each band). The table lists the number of blocks won by each bidder in the clock stage in each band. Since the same bidders won the same number of blocks in each band, the two service areas will be combined into an assignment area under both Option 1 and Option 2, and each bidder will be assigned the same frequency blocks in service areas I and II. For example, if Bidder 2 is assigned frequency blocks CDE in the 26/28 GHz band in service area I, then Bidder 2 will also be assigned blocks CDE in the 26/28 GHz band in service area II.

Table J1: Example of service areas in the same Tier 3 that are combined into an assignment area
Service area 26/28 GHz band winnings 38 GHz band winnings
I Bidder 1: 5 blocks
Bidder 2: 3 blocks
Bidder 3: 4 blocks
Bidder 4: 4 blocks
Bidder 5: 0 blocks
Bidder 1: 2 blocks
Bidder 2: 0 blocks
Bidder 3: 4 blocks
Bidder 4: 4 blocks
Bidder 5: 6 blocks
II Bidder 1: 5 blocks
Bidder 2: 3 blocks
Bidder 3: 4 blocks
Bidder 4: 4 blocks
Bidder 5: 0 blocks
Bidder 1: 2 blocks
Bidder 2: 0 blocks
Bidder 3: 4 blocks
Bidder 4: 4 blocks
Bidder 5: 6 blocks

11. Example of service areas that are not combined into an assignment area: Table J2 below provides an example of two service areas that cannot be combined into an assignment area under Option 1. Service areas III and IV are in the same Tier 3 area and do not have any encumbrances. The table lists the number of blocks won by each bidder in the clock stage in each band. The same bidders won the same number of blocks in the 26/28 GHz band, but not in the 38 GHz band. For instance, in the 38 GHz band, Bidder 1 won 6 blocks in service area III but only won 5 blocks in service area IV. Thus, the two service areas cannot be combined into an assignment area under the assumption that the two bands are assigned in the same round. This means that a bidder will not necessarily be assigned the same frequency blocks in service areas III and IV.

Table J2: Example of service areas in the same Tier 3 that are not combined into an assignment area
Service area 26/28 GHz band winnings 38 GHz band winnings
III Bidder 1: 5 blocks
Bidder 2: 5 blocks
Bidder 3: 6 blocks
Bidder 1: 6 blocks
Bidder 2: 5 blocks
Bidder 3: 5 blocks
IV Bidder 1: 5 blocks
Bidder 2: 5 blocks
Bidder 3: 6 blocks
Bidder 1: 5 blocks
Bidder 2: 5 blocks
Bidder 3: 6 blocks

12. If the two bands are assigned sequentially, then the assignment areas can be different for each of the bands. Under Option 2, service areas III and IV would be combined into an assignment area for the 26/28 GHz band, but not for the 38 GHz band.

J2. Proposed order for the assignment rounds

13. ISED is proposing to run the assignment rounds in descending order of population. This process will enable bidders to know which specific frequencies they have won in the most populated assignment areas prior to their participation in the assignment rounds for the less populated assignment areas. If some service areas are combined, the population of the resulting assignment area will be defined to equal the sum of the populations of the Tier 5 service areas that it comprises.

14. ISED is proposing to conduct a separate assignment round for each of the eight most populated assignment areas sequentially, in descending order of population.

15. Once the eight most populated assignment areas have been assigned, ISED is proposing to conduct the bidding for the remaining assignment areas in parallel.  That is, bidding for assignments in multiple assignment areas will take place during the same assignment round and the bidders will be required to submit their bids for bands in the assignment areas included in the same assignment round at the same time. This will help to reduce the duration of the assignment stage.

16. After the assignment of the eight most populous assignment areas, all remaining assignment areas will be ranked by population from highest to lowest and divided into sessions per assignment round, subject to the constraint that each assignment round will not include more than one assignment area from within the same Tier 3 service area. This constraint will be relaxed when there are fewer than 10 assignment areas remaining to be assigned. In addition, if there are 10 or more assignment areas remaining to be assigned and it is not possible to include 10 assignment areas in an assignment round while satisfying the constraint, then that assignment round may include fewer than 10 assignment areas.

17. ISED is of the view that number of sessions per assignment round and the mix of geographic areas provide a balance between the need for a timely conclusion of the assignment stage and the ability of bidders to handle assignments in different assignment areas that are run in parallel.

18. Table J3 illustrates the preliminary sequence of assignment rounds in the case that each assignment area consists of a single Tier 5 service area (i.e. no service areas are combined). The eight most populated service areas are assigned sequentially in the first eight assignment rounds. Assignment rounds 9 through 71 contain 10 sessions each, and each of the last three assignment rounds (72-74) has less than 10 sessions.

Table J3: Proposed sequence of the assignment rounds when no service areas are combined
Round number Tier Tier name Tier population Round population
1 5-282 Toronto 2,723,714 2,723,714
2 5-187 L'Île de Montréal | Island of Montreal 1,950,811 1,950,811
3 5-283 Peel 1,379,669 1,379,669
4 5-504 Calgary 1,299,627 1,299,627
5 5-521 Edmonton 1,198,083 1,198,083
6 5-209 Ottawa-Gatineau 1,191,731 1,191,731
7 5-281 York 1,129,351 1,129,351
8 5-117 Québec 766,740 766,740
9 5-400 Winnipeg 748,791 5,079,735
5-293 Kitchener-Waterloo/Guelph 674,893
5-577 Vancouver 665,314
5-280 Durham 643,578
5-185 Mascouche 581,361
5-326 London 399,186
5-041 Halifax 355,575
5-583 Victoria 352,999
5-316 Niagara-St. Catharines 349,283
5-338 Windsor 308,755
10 5-284 Halton 554,215 2,997,345
5-190 Longueuil 523,336
5-572 Surrey 521,460
5-451 Saskatoon 248,978
5-448 Regina 215,802
5-001 St. John's 208,869
5-349 Barrie 206,427
5-563 Kelowna 194,792
5-158 Sherbrooke 171,475
5-146 Trois-Rivières 151,991
71 5-599 Heriot Bay 3,519 16,936
5-650 Tlicho 2,751
5-482 Suffield 2,261
5-536 Anzac 1,943
5-388 Suomi 1,863
5-018 Hopedale 1,434
5-248 Schefferville 1,406
5-239 Sainte-Élisabeth-de-Proulx 862
5-621 Lower Post 682
5-085 Port-Menier 215
72 5-600 Bella Coola 3,293 8,511
5-637 Faro 2,614
5-019 Nain 1,125
5-539 Fort Chipewyan 1,104
5-236 Ashuapmushuan 371
5-247 Caniapiscau 4
73 5-578 Bowen Island 3,259 6,620
5-653 Sahtu 2,433
5-538 Fort McKay 928
74 5-581 Chilliwack South | Chilliwack-Sud 1,393 3,883
5-643 Sanikiluaq 882
5-540 Garden Creek 606
5-638 Mayo 537
5-645 Resolute Bay 330
5-651 Hottah Lake 135
5-649 MacKay Lake -

19. If some service areas are combined into assignment areas, the order of the assignment rounds will change in accordance with the rules outlined in paragraphs 14 and 16 of this annex.

20. Table J3 implies that, if the 26/28 GHz band and the 38 GHz band are assigned in the same assignment round and if each assignment round contains up to 10 sessions after the eight most populous service areas are assigned, then there will be at most 74 assignment rounds. The number of assignment rounds will be smaller if some service areas are combined into assignment areas. 

J3. Bidding in the assignment stage

21. For each assignment round, each bidder will be presented with a set of bidding options for each band and each assignment area assigned in the round. Even if two or more service areas have been combined into an assignment area, a bidder with winnings in those service areas will be presented a single set of bidding options for each band in the assignment area.

22. As an example, suppose that the sequence of assignment rounds is as shown in table J3 and that the 26/28 GHz and 38 GHz bands are assigned in the same round for any given service area. Then, the first assignment round will determine the assignment in both bands for service area 5-282. A bidder that has winnings only in the 26/28 GHz band in service area 5-282 will be presented with one set of bidding options. A bidder that has winnings both in the 26/28 GHz band and in the 38 GHz band in service area 5-282 will be presented with two sets of bidding options (one for each band).

23. As another example, assuming again the sequence of assignment rounds shown in table J3, consider Round 10 and a bidder that has winnings in the 26/28 GHz band for service areas 5-284 and 5-190 and in the 38 GHz band for service area 5-572. If this bidder does not have any other winnings in any of the service areas being assigned in Round 10, then the bidder will be presented with three sets of bidding options: for the 26/28 GHz band in service area 5-284, for the 26/28 GHz band in service area 5-190, and for the 38 GHz band in service area 5-572.

24. For a given band in a service area, ISED is proposing to present all contiguous bidding options that are consistent with the number of licences to be assigned to the bidder, regardless of the number of blocks to be assigned to other bidders. For example, a bidder that won 4 blocks in the 26/28 GHz band in a given service area will have 13 bidding options: CDEF, DEFG, EFGH, FGHJ, etc. The bidder might not be able to win some of its bidding options if they would preclude other bidders from being assigned contiguous spectrum in that band. The purpose of presenting all contiguous bidding options, regardless of the number of licences to be assigned to each bidder, is to maintain anonymous bidding as much as possible and thereby reduce the potential for gaming behavior in the assignment stage.

25. A bidder may specify a bid amount for each of its bidding options for a given band and assignment area. The bid amount must be non-negative, must be a multiple of $100, and cannot exceed $999,999,900. The auction system will consider a bid value of zero for any bidding option for which a bidder submits no bid.

J4. Proposed assignment determination

26. Recognizing the efficiency gains from having contiguous blocks of spectrum, ISED is proposing to assign bidders contiguous spectrum within each band in a service area.

27. For each band and assignment area combination in a given assignment round, ISED is proposing to use a solver to identify the combination of specific assignments of licences that result in the highest bid amount while ensuring that each bidder is assigned contiguous spectrum within the band and assignment area. A separate optimization will be solved for each band and assignment area combination. In the event of a tied outcome with more than one specific assignment producing the same total value, the solver will prefer assignments where all unsold blocks are contiguous. Any further ties will be broken by a pseudo-random number generator built into the auction software.

28. Specifically, if there are two or more unsold blocks in the band and assignment area combination, ties will be broken in two steps. First, the solver will determine whether the highest bid amount remains the same when all unsold blocks are assigned contiguous spectrum. If this is the case, then the solver will select an assignment that achieves the maximum value where each bidder is assigned contiguous spectrum and all unsold blocks are assigned contiguous spectrum. Otherwise, the solver will select an assignment that achieves the maximum value where each bidder is assigned contiguous spectrum (but unsold spectrum is not contiguous).

J5. Proposed pricing for the assignment stage

29. ISED is proposing to use a second-price rule to determine the prices to be paid by winning bidders in the assignment stage. More specifically, ISED is proposing to apply bidder optimal core prices and to use the “nearest Vickrey” approach in determining the assignment prices. A separate assignment price will be determined for each band in each assignment area where the bidder has winnings. The final price paid by a winning bidder would be the sum of the clock stage price(s) and the assignment stage price(s).

30. An assignment bid is a package bid for the specific frequency locations of a collection of blocks for a given band in a given assignment area. The assignment prices will be determined from the set of assignment bids for the band in the assignment area. The assignment price is attributable to the entire collection of blocks assigned to a given bidder in a given band and assignment area and not to individual blocks that comprise the package. Given the pricing rules, the assignment price will be equal to or less than the corresponding bid amount, and could even be zero.

31. For the purpose of calculating assignment prices, the Vickrey price for each Bidder J is calculated as follows. First, from the value of the winning combination of assignment bids, subtract Bidder J's winning bid (value A). Next, recalculate the winning combination of assignment bids in the hypothetical situation where all Bidder J's assignment bids are equal to zero, as if Bidder J did not have a preference for any of the assignment options that it was presented with (value B). The Vickrey price for Bidder J is defined as the value of the winning combination of assignment bids with all Bidder J's bids set to equal zero (value B) minus the sum of the winning assignment bids for all bidders other than Bidder J (value A), that is, value B minus value A.

32. An extra payment beyond the Vickrey prices is sometimes required as a result of complementarities. In the event that an extra payment is required, the calculation of the additional payment to be paid by a given bidder will be weighted based on the number of blocks being assigned to that bidder in the given band and assignment area.

33. For a given band and assignment area, the assignment prices must satisfy the following conditions:

First condition: Each assignment price must be positive or zero and not more than the dollar amount of the winning assignment stage bid.

Second condition: The set of assignment prices must be sufficiently high that there is no bidder or group of bidders willing to pay more for an alternative feasible assignment. If there is only one set of assignment prices that satisfies the first two conditions, this determines the assignment prices.

Third condition: If there are many sets of assignment prices that satisfy the first and second conditions, the set(s) of assignment prices minimizing the sum of assignment prices across winning bidders is (are) selected. If there is only one set of assignment prices that satisfies these three conditions, this will determine the assignment prices.

Fourth condition: If there are many sets of assignment prices that satisfy the first three conditions, the set of assignment prices that minimizes the weighted sum of squares of differences between the assignment prices and the Vickrey prices will be selected. The weighting is relative to the number of blocks being assigned to the bidder in that band and assignment area. This approach for selecting among sets of assignment prices that minimize the sum of assignment prices is referred to as the “nearest Vickrey” approach.

34. A software algorithm will be used to determine the set of assignment prices that meet the conditions outlined above.

35. The following is an example of how assignment prices are calculated. This example is based on the 2013 Spectrum Auction Design paper [PDF: 1,085 KB] by Peter Cramton.

36. For expository ease, this example assumes that the following blocks are available in the auction for a given band and assignment area combination: A, B, C, D, E, and F. Suppose that there are five bidders, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, bidding for the assignment of these 6 blocks. In the clock stage, Bidders 1, 2, 4 and 5 won 1 block in this band and service area and Bidder 3 won 2 blocks. Bidders 1 and 4 would like to get Block A, Bidders 2 and 5 would like to get Block B and Bidder 3 would like to get Blocks A and B. Bidders do not put any value on other blocks available for the assignment. The following bids are submitted (the subscript of “b” designates the bidder):

  • b1{A} = $28
  • b2{B} = $20
  • b3{AB} = $32
  • b4{A} = $14
  • b5{B} = $12

37. The bids of the five bidders are represented in figure J1, below.

38. In this example, the highest value combination of bids would assign Block A to Bidder 1, Block B to Bidder 2, and Blocks C, D, E and F to Bidders 3, 4 and 5 generating $48 in value. The distribution of Blocks C,D, E and F among Bidders 3, 4 and 5 will be decided by a tie-breaking algorithm based on random numbers. There is no other assignment of the blocks that yields a higher value.

39. To calculate the Vickrey price for Bidder 1, its winning bid ($28) is subtracted from the value of the winning combination ($48), resulting in $20. Next, the winning combination of packages is recalculated for the hypothetical situation in which Bidder 1's bids are excluded. The best assignment, excluding Bidder 1, assigns Block A to Bidder 4 at $14 and Block B to Bidder 2 at $20, resulting in $34. The Vickrey price for Bidder 1 is the value of the winning combination of packages with all Bidder 1's bids excluded ($34) less the sum of the winning assignment stage bids for all bidders other than Bidder 1 ($20)—that is, its Vickrey price is $14 ($34 - $20).

40. Similarly, to calculate the Vickrey price for Bidder 2, its winning bid ($20) is subtracted from the value of the winning combination ($48), resulting in $28. Next, the winning combination of packages is recalculated for the hypothetical situation in which Bidder 2's bids are excluded. The best assignment, excluding Bidder 2, assigns Block A to Bidder 1 and Block B to Bidder 5, resulting in a value of $40. The Vickrey price for Bidder 2 is the value of the winning combination of packages with all Bidder 2's bids excluded ($40) less the sum of the winning assignment stage bids for all bidders other than Bidder 2 ($28)—that is, its Vickrey price is $12 ($40 - $28).

41. Hence, the Vickrey outcome is for Bidder 1 to pay $14 for the assignment of Block A and for Bidder 2 to pay $12 for Block B. Bidders 3, 4, and 5 are assigned Blocks C, D, E and F at zero price. Total revenues with these payments are $14 + $12 = $26. As shown in figure J1, this means that Bidder 1 can reduce its bid to $14 before being displaced by Bidder 4. Similarly, Bidder 2 can reduce its bid to $12 before being displaced by Bidder 5.

42. However, these payments sum to $26, which is less than Bidder 3's bid of $32 for the assignment of Blocks A and B. Therefore, Bidder 1 and Bidder 2 must split an additional payment of $6 ($32 – $26) in order to ensure that their combined payment is greater than that of Bidder 3, satisfying the condition that no other bidder or group of bidders were prepared to pay more for an alternative feasible assignment. To do so, Bidder 1 and Bidder 2 must pay, collectively, at least $32.

Figure J1: Example of calculating assignment prices

Figure J1: Example of calculating assignment prices
Description of Figure J1

This figure is a graph illustrating the example in paragraph 36 of annex J, which demonstrates how to calculate assignment prices using a second-price rule and why an additional payment beyond second prices is sometimes required.

43. Because the same number of blocks are being assigned to Bidder 1 and to Bidder 2, the additional payment of $6 is split equally between the two bidders in this example. Each bidder is therefore paying an additional $3 above its Vickrey price, with Bidder 1 paying $17 ($14 + $3) and Bidder 2 paying $15 ($12 + $3), as shown in figure J1.

44. However, if each bidder was being assigned a different number of blocks, the two bidders would split the extra payment proportionately, in reference to the number of blocks being assigned to each bidder (the fourth condition). For example, if 2 blocks were being assigned to Bidder 1 and 1 block was being assigned to Bidder 2 then Bidder 1 would pay twice as much as Bidder 2 of the extra payment.

J6. Information at the end of each assignment round

45. Following the end of each assignment round, after the results have been verified, each bidder will be notified of the specific licences that it has won and the assignment price to be paid, for each band and assignment area assigned in the round. In doing this, bidders will know their own results from one assignment round before participating in a subsequent assignment round.

J7. Final price

46. At the end of the assignment stage, ISED will determine the final price that each winning bidder will be required to pay for the licences it has been assigned. This final price will be equal to the sum of the posted price(s) of the final clock round for all generic licences that the bidder won plus any associated assignment price(s).

J8. Information at the end of the assignment stage

47. Following the end of the assignment stage, winning bidders will be notified of the specific licences that they have won, as well as the final price to be paid.

J9. Information after the end of the auction

48. The following information will be made publicly available following the conclusion of the auction process:

  • the list of winning bidders, licences won, and prices to be paid
  • the bids submitted by each bidder in every clock round, including the bidder’s identity
  • the start-of-round and clock prices for each product in every clock round
  • the assignment bids submitted by each bidder, including the bidder’s identity and the corresponding assignment prices

Annex K: Opening bids and eligibility points

Table K1 provides the opening bid prices for blocks based on the population and $/MHz/pop for each Tier 5 service area. Population is based on 2016 Census data. The table also provides the number of eligibility points for a 100 MHz block for each Tier 5 service area.

Table K1: Opening bid prices and eligibility points for 100 MHz blocks
Tier number Service area name Category Population $/MHz/pop $/MHz/pop FR Opening bid ($) Eligibility points